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i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1) Does the Maryland “county” income tax violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause by discouraging cross-border 
commerce in favor of in-state commerce?
 (2) If the Maryland “county” income tax violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause, does the Constitution require 
Maryland to fully credit the taxes of other states against 
its “county” tax?
ii
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BRIEF OF MICHAEL S. KNOLL AND RUTH 
MASON AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF 
AFFIRMANCE
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are tax professors who, based on their expertise 
in law and economics, conclude that the Maryland personal 
income tax regime, specifi cally the Maryland “county” tax, 
violates the dormant Commerce Clause by discouraging 
interstate commerce, but that a credit is not the only 
possible remedy for the breach.
Michael S. Knoll is Deputy Dean and Theodore 
Warner Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School; Professor of Real Estate, The Wharton School; 
Co-director, Center for Tax Law and Policy, University 
of Pennsylvania. Much of Professor Knoll’s recent 
research focuses on the connections between taxation and 
competitiveness. 
Ruth Mason is Hunton & Williams Professor of 
Law at the University of Virginia School of Law. Most 
of her academic work focuses on the meaning of tax 
discrimination in various legal contexts, including U.S. 
constitutional law, tax treaties, and European Union law.
1.  No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or 
in part and no entity or person, aside from amici curiae and their 
counsel, made any monetary contribution toward the preparation 
or submission of this brief. Counsel of record for all parties have 
consented to this fi ling in letters on fi le with the Clerk’s offi ce.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The internal consistency test reveals that Maryland 
applies systematically higher “county” taxes to interstate 
commerce than to in-state commerce. 
Economic analysis of Maryland’s tax regime—
including its taxes on inbound, outbound, and domestic 
activities—confirms what the internal consistency 
test suggests, namely, that the Maryland “county” 
tax discourages interstate commerce. Specifi cally, the 
Maryland tax regime discourages Maryland residents 
from earning income outside of Maryland, and it 
simultaneously discourages nonresidents from earning 
income in Maryland. Maryland alone causes this 
distortion; the distortion does not depend on the taxes 
imposed by any other state.
Petitioner’s argument that Maryland’s outbound tax 
regime should be upheld because it is facially neutral 
when compared to Maryland’s domestic tax requires the 
Court to ignore Maryland’s inbound tax on nonresidents. 
Ignoring relevant parts of a state’s tax regime obscures 
the overall effect of that regime on interstate commerce. 
Although crediting other states’ taxes would cure 
Maryland’s dormant Commerce Clause violation, other 
practical and legitimate alternatives for curing the 
violation exist. Maryland, not the courts, should decide 
how to cure the constitutional infi rmity in Maryland’s 
tax regime.
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ARGUMENT
I. Maryland’s Income Tax Regime Discourages 
Interstate Commerce
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause Prevents 
States from Encouraging In-state Commerce 
at the Expense of Interstate Commerce
The dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution 
“is the doctrine that the Commerce Clause, by its own 
force and without national legislation, puts it into the 
power of the Court to place limits on state authority.” 
Felix Frankfurter, the Commerce Clause under Marshall, 
Taney & Waite, 18 (1937). Underlying the Commerce 
Clause is the framers’ “conviction that in order to succeed 
the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward 
economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among 
the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles 
of Confederation.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 41 U.S. 322, 325-
26 (1979). Accordingly, “[o]ur [economic] system, fostered 
by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every 
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty 
that he will have free access to every market in the Nation. 
. . .” H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 
539 (1949). As interpreted by this Court, the dormant 
Commerce Clause prohibits a state from using its tax 
system to “place[] burdens on the fl ow of commerce across 
its borders that commerce wholly within those borders 
would not bear.” Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 
Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995). 
4
B. Mar yland’s  Tax Regime is  Internally 
Inconsistent
The internal consistency test makes clear that 
Maryland overburdens, and hence discourages, interstate 
commerce as compared to purely in-state commerce. 
Acknowledging the importance of state tax sovereignty, 
this Court developed the internal consistency test as 
a standard for when state taxes violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Under the test,
[i]nternal consistency is preserved when the 
imposition of a tax identical to the one in 
question by every other State would add no 
burden to interstate commerce that intrastate 
commerce would not also bear. This test asks 
nothing about the degree of economic reality 
refl ected by the tax, but simply looks to the 
structure of the tax at issue to see whether 
its identical application by every state in the 
Union would place interstate commerce at a 
disadvantage as compared with commerce 
intrastate.
Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. at 185.
Maryland formally divides its individual income tax 
into a “state” portion with a maximum rate of 4.75%, and 
a “county” portion with rates ranging from 1.25% to 3.2%. 
Md. Code Ann., Tax-General (T.G.) §§ 10-102, 10-103(a)
(1). Maryland allows taxes paid to other states to fully 
offset the “state” portion of the tax, but it disallows any 
credit against the “county” tax. T.G. § 10-703(a). Since 
the substance of this dispute concerns only the “county” 
5
tax, we will analyze only the “county” tax.2 Ignoring the 
uncontested “state” portion of the tax, the Maryland tax 
regime contains the following elements: 
For residents:
1. On income earned in Maryland, “county” tax 
of 1.25% to 3.2%, depending on the county of 
residence (domestic tax) T.G. § 10-103(a)(1) 
2. On income earned in other states, “county” tax 
of 1.25% to 3.2%, depending on the county of 
residence, against which and there is no credit 
for other states’ taxes (outbound tax) T.G. §§ 10-
103(a)(1), 10-703 
For nonresidents, 
3. On income earned in Maryland, “county” tax 
(i.e., Special Non-Resident Tax (SNRT)) of 1.25% 
(inbound tax) T.G. § 10-106.1(a).3 
2.  The formal division by Maryland of its tax into “state” and 
“county” taxes has no effect on constitutional analysis. See, e.g., 
Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946) (striking down a 
municipal license tax on business solicitors for violating the dormant 
Commerce Clause); see also Frey v. Comptroller of Treasury, 29 A.3d 
475, 492 (Md. 2011) (concluding that Maryland’s “county” income 
taxes were state taxes for constitutional law purposes).
3.  Just as it taxes residents, Maryland subjects nonresidents 
with Maryland-source income to the 4.75% “state” portion of 
the Maryland individual income tax, but we ignore the “state” 
portion of the tax for purposes of this analysis. See T.G. § 10-
105(d). In lieu of the SNRT, Maryland subjects nonresidents who 
receive compensation for employment in Maryland to the “county” 
6
4. On income earned in other states, no tax 
The Wynnes resided in Howard County, where the 
“county” tax rate was 3.2%, so the Wynnes paid “county” 
tax of 3.2% on their domestic and outbound income. Figure 
1 schematically represents the Maryland “county” tax 
regime for Howard county.  
Figure 1. Maryland “County” Tax Regime
MARYLAND 
RESIDENT
RESIDENT OF 
ANOTHER STATE
ACTIVITY IN 
ANOTHER STATE
Outbound Tax
3.2% N/A
ACTIVITY IN 
MARYLAND
Domestic Tax
3.2%
Inbound Tax
1.25%
The internal consistency test directs us to assume 
that every state enacts the same tax regime as Maryland, 
and then the test asks whether, under such hypothetical 
harmonization, interstate commerce suffers a greater 
burden than does in-state commerce. Figure 2 shows 
how income would be taxed if every state (represented 
here by Delaware) adopted the Maryland “county” tax 
as employed in Howard County:
tax rates ranging from 1.25% to 3.2%. See T.G. § 10-103(a)(4). 
Nonresidents with Maryland income from sources other than 
employment pay the SNRT, which Maryland sets equal to the 
lowest “county” tax rate, 1.25%. 
7
Figure 2.  Maryland Tax under 
Internal Consistency Test4
MARYLAND 
RESIDENT
DELAWARE 
RESIDENT
ACTIVITY IN 
DELAWARE 4.45%
4 3.2%
ACTIVITY IN 
MARYLAND 3.2% 4.45%
Figure 2 shows that the Maryland “county” tax 
is internally inconsistent because under hypothetical 
harmonization in-state income would be taxed at 3.2%, 
whereas interstate income would be taxed at 4.45%. 
The shaded quadrants in Figure 2 represent interstate 
income, comprising Maryland income earned by Delaware 
residents and Delaware income earned by Maryland 
residents. In contrast, the unshaded quadrants represent 
in-state income, comprised of Maryland income earned 
by Maryland residents and Delaware income earned by 
Delaware residents. 
4. Delaware, employing a tax regime identical to Maryland’s, 
would impose a Special Non-Resident Tax (SNRT) of 1.25% on 
taxpayers, like the Wynnes, who reside in Maryland but earn 
income in Delaware. Maryland would not credit the Delaware 
SNRT against its own 3.2% residence-based “county” tax. The 
Delaware source-based SNRT tax (or “county tax”) plus the 
Maryland residence-based “county” tax yields a total, source-
and-residence tax rate of 4.45%. 
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Maryland fails the internal consistency test regardless 
of the county analyzed.5 Also, Maryland fails the test 
regardless of whether we consider the state’s tax system 
in its entirety—by examining both the “state” and the 
“county” tax together—or if we consider the “county” tax 
separately.6 This is so because the Maryland “county” tax 
rate for interstate income is 1.25% higher than its “county” 
tax rate for purely in-state income.7 Because “a law [is] 
discriminatory if it taxes a transaction or incident more 
heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs 
entirely within the State,” Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 
516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996), the Maryland Court of Appeals 
correctly concluded that the Maryland tax regime violates 
the dormant Commerce Clause. Pet. Br. App. 22.
5.  If, for example, we apply the internal consistency test 
to the lowest Maryland “county” tax rate of 1.25%, then in-state 
income is always taxed at 1.25%, whereas interstate income is 
always taxed at 2.5%. Maryland’s “county” tax rate on cross-
border income is always 1.25% higher than the “county” tax rate 
on domestic income. 
6.  Although the Maryland “state” tax passes the internal 
consistency test because it credits the taxes of other states, the 
“state” tax does not fi x the internal inconsistency in the “county” 
tax. 
7. As a theoretical matter, we could attribute this difference 
in tax rates to any of three features of Maryland’s tax regime. We 
could attribute it to: (1) Maryland imposing a tax that is too low on 
its residents’ in-state income, (2) Maryland charging a tax that is 
too high on residents’ out-of-state income (for example, because 
it fails to credit other states’ source taxes taxes), or (3) Maryland 
charging a tax that is too high on nonresidents’ Maryland-source 
income. As we discuss later, the indeterminacy of the origin of 
Maryland’s restraint on interstate commerce leads to multiple 
possible ways that Maryland could cure its constitutional violation.
9
The United States objects that the court below found 
that Maryland violated internal consistency only because 
the Maryland court improperly considered Maryland’s 
1.25% tax on nonresidents (the SNRT). U.S. Br. 24. The 
United States argues that “Respondents are not subject to 
that tax, have not challenged it, and suffer no injury from 
it.” U.S. Br. 24. This argument misses the point that the 
dormant Commerce Clause protects interstate commerce, 
not people. Moreover, the leading treatise on state taxation 
explains that “the internal consistency test does not 
require that taxpayers demonstrate that they have actually 
suffered injury from the challenged tax, but only that the 
hypothetical application of the challenged tax by other 
states would subject them to a more onerous tax burden 
than that shouldered by taxpayers engaged in intrastate 
commerce.” J. Hellerstein et al., State Taxation, ¶ 4.16[1]
[b] (3d ed. 2014). Finally, as shown below, the SNRT in fact 
harms Respondents because, in addition to discouraging 
nonresidents from conducting business in Maryland, the 
SNRT simultaneously discourages Maryland residents, 
including the Wynnes, from conducting business outside 
Maryland. Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. 325 (1996) (holding that 
a state’s intangibles tax violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause because it discouraged residents from investing 
in out-of-state companies).  
C. Economic Analysis Confi rms That Maryland’s 
Tax Regime Prefers In-State To Interstate 
Commerce
Economic analysis shows that Maryland violates 
the dormant Commerce Clause because the Maryland 
“county” tax distorts interstate competition. Specifi cally, 
the Maryland “county” tax encourages Maryland 
residents to earn income in Maryland rather than in other 
10
states, and it simultaneously also encourages nonresidents 
to earn income outside Maryland, rather than within 
Maryland. Moreover, we show that applying the internal 
consistency test to state taxes generates the same results 
as does economic analysis. Because economic analysis 
and the internal consistency test produce the same 
result, the internal consistency test is a good heuristic 
for evaluating whether a state’s tax system violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause.
Whereas states apply corporate taxes using formula 
apportionment, states apply individual income taxes on a 
source and residence basis. Evaluating the impact of state 
individual income taxes on interstate commerce requires 
consideration of both source and residence taxes because 
states may discourage interstate commerce through their 
source taxes, their residence taxes, or a combination of 
both taxes. Thus, although Petitioner urges the Court to 
ignore Maryland’s tax treatment of inbound commerce 
(Pet. Br. 34), determining whether a tax system is neutral 
between in-state and interstate commerce requires (as 
described further below) comparing how a state taxes its 
residents’ purely in-state income with how it taxes both 
outbound and inbound economic activities. 
Each state can tax three kinds of income: 
(1) domestic income, which is in-state income earned 
by residents, 
(2) outbound income, which is out-of-state income 
earned by residents, and 
(3) inbound income, which is in-state income earned 
by nonresidents. 
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States generally lack jurisdiction under the Due Process 
Clause to tax the income that nonresidents earn in other 
states. To avoid distorting interstate competition between 
residents of different states, a taxing state has the 
freedom to set the tax rates on two of those three kinds 
of income, but having set the fi rst two rates, the third rate 
is algebraically determined by the fi rst two.  
The economic analysis is straight-forward. The share 
of income that a taxpayer retains after paying tax is called 
a retention rate. Figure 3 provides, for each kind of income 
taxable by Maryland, retention rates for Maryland and 
non-Maryland (proxied by Delaware) taxpayers after 
paying Maryland tax. Thus, Figure 3 provides the share 
of earnings retained after-Maryland-tax.
Figure 3.  
Retention Rates on Income Taxable by Maryland
MARYLAND 
RESIDENT
DELAWARE 
RESIDENT
ACTIVITY IN
DELAWARE
Outbound Income
1-To
1
ACTIVITY IN
MARYLAND
Domestic Income
1-Td
Inbound Income
1-Ti
The retention rate for a Maryland resident on an 
investment in Maryland is 1-Td, where Td is Maryland’s 
tax on its residents’ in-state income (i.e., Maryland’s 
domestic tax).  Likewise, the retention rate for a Maryland 
resident on an investment in Delaware is 1-To, where To 
is Maryland’s tax on residents’ out-of-state income (i.e., 
Maryland’s outbound tax). 
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The retention rate for a Delaware resident an 
investment in Maryland is 1-Ti, where Ti is Maryland’s 
tax on nonresidents’ Maryland-source income (i.e., 
Maryland’s inbound tax). Since Maryland does not tax 
nonresidents’ out-of-state income, a Delaware resident’s 
after-Maryland-tax retention rate on an investment in 
Maryland equals 1. 
Because investors allocate capital across investments 
in different taxing jurisdictions based upon relative 
retention ratios (i.e., comparisons of retention ratios),8 
8.  In an environment without taxes, the major result of 
capital asset pricing models (CAPM) is that all investors end up 
holding the full universe of available risky assets in the same 
proportion as those assets are available in the market. Investors 
might vary the amount of riskless debt and risky assets they 
hold, and of course the total amount invested in risky assets will 
differ depending upon the size of one’s investment portfolio and 
attitude towards risk, but everyone will hold the same portfolio 
of risky assets, differing only in the size of the portfolio, but not 
in the relative portion of the portfolio (of risky assets) invested in 
each asset. The risky portfolio of assets held by each taxpayer is 
called the market portfolio because it is composed of a pro-rata 
portion of all available (risky) assets. 
The after-tax capital asset pricing model (after-tax CAPM) 
describes how taxes affect the manner in which investors allocate 
their investment capital across assets in an environment with 
differentially taxed assets and taxpayers. The main insight from 
after-tax CAPM is that the intensity of an investor’s demand for an 
asset is determined not by a simple comparison of how an investor 
is taxed on that asset relative to how other investors are taxed on 
that same asset. Instead, the intensity of an investor’s demand for 
an asset is determined by how she is taxed on that asset relative 
to how she is taxed on the market portfolio as compared to how 
other investors are taxed on that asset relative to how they are 
13
we need to calculate the retention ratios of Maryland 
and Delaware residents on investments in Maryland. 
A Maryland resident’s retention ratio is the share of 
income remaining when she invests in Maryland relative 
to what remains when she invests outside Maryland (in 
Delaware). Thus, a Maryland resident’s retention ratio on 
an investment in Maryland is (1-Td)/(1-To). In contrast, a 
Delaware resident’s retention ratio is the share of income 
she retains when she invests in Maryland relative to 
what she retains when she invests in Delaware. Thus a 
Delaware resident’s retention ratio on an investment in 
Maryland is (1-Ti)/1, or 1-Ti.
taxed on the market portfolio. The central result that emerges 
from after-tax CAPM is that an investor will tend to invest 
more intensively in an asset when she is taxed lightly on an asset 
relative to how the same investor is taxed on the market portfolio 
as compared to how other investors are taxed on the asset relative 
to how they are taxed on the market portfolio. The converse also 
holds, so an investor will shy away from an asset that bears higher 
tax relative to the market portfolio for the investor compared to 
other investors’ relative tax for that asset. See Michael Brennan, 
Taxes, Market Valuation and Corporate Financial Policy, 23 
Nat’l Tax J. 417 (1970); Roger H. Gordon & David F. Bradford, 
Taxation and the Stock Market Valuation of Capital Gains and 
Dividends, 14 J. Pub. Econ. 109 (1980). 
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In order for taxes not to distort interstate commerce, 
the retention ratios across Maryland and Delaware must 
be the same for residents of Maryland and residents of 
Delaware.9 This requirement can be written as:
1 – Td
1 – To
= 1 – Ti (1)
Equation 1 describes the condition for income taxes 
not to distort interstate competition in terms of retention 
rates, which are the share of pre-tax income taxpayers 
retain after paying Maryland tax. That presentation 
highlights the mechanism—individual investment choice—
whereby tax affects interstate competition. It is also 
possible to describe the non-distortion condition in terms 
of tax rates, thereby providing states with straightforward 
guidelines for avoiding distorting interstate competition. 
After a few simple arithmetic operations, Equation 1 can 
be rewritten as: 
         Td     = To + Ti – (To x Ti). (2)
That is, the tax rate applied to the domestic income 
of residents must equal the sum of the tax rates paid by 
9.  How taxation affects competition between residents 
of different states depends upon relative retention ratios. If 
the parties’ ratios are the same (even though their tax rates 
are different), then taxation will not affect where either party 
invests. If, however, their ratios are different, then taxation will 
distort competition. Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What is Tax 
Discrimination?, 121 Yale L. J. 1014, 1060-74 (2012). 
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residents on out-of-state income and by nonresidents on 
domestic income less the product of those two rates.10 If a 
state’s tax rates do not satisfy Equation 2, its tax system 
distorts interstate competition.11 Notice that this equation 
does not specify any of the rates; rather it specifi es the 
relationship that the rates must maintain with respect to 
each other. A state may set its tax rates as high or low 
as it wants. The dormant Commerce Clause, however, 
prevents a state from setting its tax on domestic income 
independently from its tax on interstate (inbound and 
outbound) income.
In addition to describing this result mathematically, in 
academic work amici describe the result more intuitively 
as requiring that all taxes be assessed on either a uniform 
source or a uniform residence basis.12 A source tax is 
uniform if it applies at the same rate and on the same 
base13 to both residents’ and nonresidents’ income from the 
state. A residence tax is uniform if it applies at the same 
rate and on the same base to residents’ in-state and out-
10.  Expressed slightly differently, the tax rate Maryland 
applies to its residents’ Maryland-source income must be the 
same as if Maryland fi rst applied the rate applicable to residents’ 
out-of-state income and then applied to the remaining income the 
rate applicable to nonresidents’ Maryland-source income. 
11.  Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, Waiting for Perseus, 67 
Tax L. Rev. 375, 436-41 (2014) (providing an algebraic derivation 
of non-distortion conditions).
12.  Mason & Knoll, What is Tax Discrimination?, supra, 
at 1060-74 (describing uniformity requirements for taxes not to 
distort competition).
13.  “Tax base” refers to the rules for calculating taxable 
income.
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of-state income. And if a state taxes on both a source and 
residence basis, it must apply both source and residence 
taxes to its residents’ in-state income.
Courts interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause 
need not engage in the kind of economic analysis we 
presented here. Instead, the principle that underlies 
the dormant Commerce Clause—that states should not 
distort competition between their residents and residents 
of other states—generates simple rules of thumb. One 
rule of thumb, represented by Equation 1, is that a state 
must set tax rates so that retention ratios for residents 
and nonresidents are equal across jurisdictions. A second 
rule of thumb, represented by Equation 2, is that the tax 
rate on residents’ in-state income must equal the combined 
tax rate on the in-state income of nonresidents and on the 
out-of-state income of residents.14 A third rule of thumb 
is that state taxes must be uniform. 
Still another rule of thumb is the Court’s internal 
consistency test. Taxes that fail the kind of economic 
analysis we just conducted also will fail the internal 
consistency test. This equivalence arises because the 
hypothetical harmonization performed under the internal 
consistency test has the effect of applying to residents that 
earn out-of-state income and to nonresidents that earn in-
state income both the state’s treatment of nonresidents’ 
14.  The fi rst two rules of thumb, retention ratios and tax 
rates, apply when the only issue in dispute is tax rates, not tax 
bases. The uniformity rule and the internal consistency test apply 
to cases involving base or rate challenges, or both. All four rules 
of thumb require adjustment when the residence state provides 
a credit for foreign taxes. See, e.g., Mason & Knoll, What is Tax 
Discrimination?, supra, at 1074.
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in-state income and the state’s treatment of residents’ 
out-of-state income. The internal consistency test thus 
calculates the combined tax rate from assessing both of 
those taxes and then compares the combined tax to the 
rate the state imposes on residents’ domestic income. If the 
rates are the same, then there is no violation. If the rates 
are different, then taxes distort competition.15 Thus, the 
internal consistency test asks the same question as does 
economics in determining whether a state’s tax system 
distorts competition between residents of different states. 
Regardless of whether we frame the inquiry for 
identifying tax systems that discourage interstate 
commerce algebraically using formulas, intuitively using 
uniformity rules, or schematically using the internal 
consistency test, the result is the same: Maryland’s 
“county” tax discourages interstate commerce. Maryland 
taxes domestic income earned by Maryland residents 
at a lower rate (3.2%) than it taxes cross-border income 
15.  Thus, not only in substance, but in form as well the 
internal consistency test is equivalent to the tax rate rule as 
described in Equation 2. The left side of Equation 2, the tax rate 
on domestic residents’ domestic income, is the same value as in 
the unshaded (i.e., in-state income) quadrants of Figure 2. The 
right side of Equation 2, the total tax rate from applying the 
state’s taxes on inbound and outbound commerce, is the same 
as the values in the shaded (i.e., interstate income) quadrants of 
Figure 2. Because the internal consistency test asks whether the 
tax rates in all four quadrants are equal, it is essentially asking 
whether Equation 2 holds. The internal consistency test is also 
equivalent to the rule of thumb that retention ratios should be 
equal across residents of different states because that rule, which 
was mathematically expressed in Equation 1, was the source from 
which Equation 2 was derived. Finally, non-uniform tax laws fail 
the internal consistency test because a system with non-uniform 
laws violates Equation 2.
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(4.45%, comprised of the 3.2% outbound tax plus the 1.25% 
inbound tax).16 
Maryland’s higher taxes on interstate income than 
domestic income generate distortions that affect both 
residents and nonresidents. Specifically, Maryland 
discourages residents from engaging in out-of-state 
commerce and, at the same time, it discourages 
nonresidents from engaging in commerce in Maryland 
(including raising capital from Maryland residents). These 
distortions stem from Maryland alone; they will persist 
even if no other state imposes a tax.17
D. The Internal Consistency Test Is An Appropriate 
and Helpful Heuristic for Revealing Whether 
a State’s Tax System Violates the Dormant 
Commerce Clause 
Petitioner, the United States, and other amici argue 
that this Court should not apply the internal consistency 
test because it is clear that under the Due Process Clause 
Maryland has the power to tax the Wynnes’ worldwide 
income and hence, in their view, there is no issue of fair 
apportionment. Pet. Br. 37, U.S. Br. 20, Multistate Tax 
Comm’n Br. 7. But possession by a state of jurisdiction 
to tax a person under the Due Process Clause does not 
16.  Because Maryland does not appear to allow for the 
purpose of calculating “county” taxable income a deduction for 
taxes paid to the source state, the tax on cross-border income is 
4.45%, not 4.41%.
17.  For more on the two-directional distortion caused 
by non-uniform taxation, see Mason & Knoll, What is Tax 
Discrimination?, supra, at 1051-71.
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immunize the state from the requirement that it exercise 
that jurisdiction consistently with other constitutional 
provisions, including the dormant Commerce Clause. 
Both the fair apportionment and nondiscrimination 
requirements of the dormant Commerce Clause aim 
to ensure that a state does not discourage interstate 
commerce relative to in-state commerce. We take 
no position on whether Maryland violates the fair 
apportionment prong or the nondiscrimination prong of 
the Complete Auto test. Complete Auto. Transit, Inc. v. 
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).18 Rather, we conclude that 
Maryland violates the dormant Commerce Clause by 
discouraging interstate commerce relative to in-state 
commerce. Because the internal consistency test provides 
the same result as economic analysis in evaluating 
whether a state tax discourages interstate commerce 
compared to in-state commerce (which is the central issue 
in dormant Commerce Clause cases), the test is useful in 
18.  We regard failure to apportion taxes fairly to be a 
subset of tax discrimination as we defi ne it in our academic work. 
See Mason & Knoll, What is Tax Discrimination?, supra, at 
1060-72. Cf. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination 
Against International Commerce, 54 Tax L. Rev. 131, 154 (2001) 
(“[a]lthough not explicitly framed as a nondiscrimination 
requirement, the [tax] treaty requirement of either a credit or 
exemption could thus be considered such a requirement”); Michael 
J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and 
the Political and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 Yale L. 
J. 1186, 1240-1 (2006) (“the Supreme Court has invalidated state 
tax laws favoring in-state products, producers, and production,” 
but that last kind of case is rare because “the U.S. states’ use 
of formulary apportionment. . . reduces the role of residence 
taxation because the allocation factors generally relate to source 
or consumption”).
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both apportionment and discrimination cases. Indeed, 
the Court has used internal consistency to evaluate both 
discrimination and apportionment cases. See, e.g., Armco, 
Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984) (applying internal 
consistency test in a discrimination case). 
In arguing against applying dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis, including the internal consistency test, 
to individual income taxation of resident taxpayers, the 
United States notes that corporate taxes operate on 
“different principles” from individual income taxes. U.S. 
Br. 29-30. Nevertheless, the relevant question under 
the dormant Commerce Clause is the same as applied 
to individual or corporate taxes, namely, does the state 
discourage interstate commerce compared to in-state 
commerce? We see no reason why the Court should not 
continue to apply the logical rigor and clarity of the 
internal consistency test to income tax cases. 
Petitioner argues that it “make[s] little sense” to 
apply the internal consistency test to individual income 
taxes. Pet. Br. 38. Accordingly, we list some of the 
virtues of using the internal consistency test to evaluate 
whether individual income taxes discourage cross-border 
commerce.19 
First, the dormant Commerce Clause operates as 
a restraint on state taxation of individuals as well as 
corporations, and therefore, the same standards should 
19.  This analysis draws on our academic work. See Ruth 
Mason, Made in America for European Tax: The Internal 
Consistency Test, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 1277, 1284-1300, 1309-1319 
(2008); Georg Kofl er & Ruth Mason, Double Taxation: A European 
“Switch in Time”?, 14 Colum. J. Eur. L. 63, 83-94 (2007).
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apply to both. The failure to apply the internal consistency 
test (or one of the equivalent tests above) to individual 
taxes would create a large gap in the dormant Commerce 
Clause and provide states with a roadmap for restricting 
interstate commerce and dividing up the national market 
into a series of state markets. If the Court upholds 
Maryland’s “county” tax, what would prevent Maryland 
from relabeling its “state” tax a “county” tax and 
completely eliminating credits for other states’ taxes? In 
that case, under hypothetical harmonization, the Wynnes 
and their Delaware counterparts would pay tax at 7.95% 
on in-state income and at 15.9% on cross-border income. 
Such a tax would surely discourage interstate commerce 
in favor of in-state commerce. 
Second, the internal consistency test makes it easier 
for courts to analyze state taxes under the dormant 
Commerce Clause because it allows courts to evaluate 
a single state’s tax regime on its own terms, without 
the need to consider any other state’s taxes. Because a 
court considers only one state’s law under the internal 
consistency test, a question never arises as to which state 
generated the interstate tax disadvantage. As this Court 
has said, the constitutionality of one state’s law should not 
“depend on the shifting complexities of the tax laws of 49 
other States.” Armco, Inc., 467 U.S. 638, 644-45 (1984).
Third, the internal consistency test helps avoid judicial 
error. As long as they do not discriminate, states retain 
autonomy to set their tax rates. As a result, in the real 
world, adoption by other states of higher or lower tax rates 
than that of the challenged state may lead to false positives 
or false negatives, respectively, when courts attempt to 
discern discrimination by comparing the amount of tax 
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paid on interstate commerce to the amount of tax paid 
on purely in-state commerce. Because tax rates vary, 
the payment of higher, lower, or equal taxes on cross-
border and in-state commerce does not dispose of the 
discrimination question. 
Fourth, the internal consistency test helps courts 
distinguish tax discrimination from nondiscriminatory 
cases of double taxation. This Court has held that 
nondiscriminatory instances of double taxation, such as 
those arising from disparities in states’ income tax bases, 
do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., 
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 279 (1978). Because 
the interaction of disparate, but nondiscriminatory, 
tax regimes may result in nondiscriminatory double 
or “overlapping” taxation, the absence or presence of 
unrelieved double taxation cannot serve as a reliable 
guide to whether a state’s tax regime is constitutionally 
infi rm.20 Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S. at 268 (approving 
Iowa’s single-factor apportionment formula even though 
20.  For example, no constitutional principle tells us who 
ought to be taxable on alimony, the payer or recipient. States may 
adopt nondiscriminatory, albeit disparate, tax policies for taxing 
alimony. Imagine State A taxes alimony to the recipient, and 
offers a deduction to the payer, while State B denies a deduction 
to the payer, but excludes the alimony from the income of the 
recipient. These regimes are different, but they both have the 
effect of taxing the alimony only once between the payer and the 
recipient, and neither discriminates. Nevertheless, a disadvantage 
arises when a State B resident pays alimony to a State A recipient 
because the A resident must include the alimony, but the B 
resident gets no deduction. Conversely, a double benefi t would 
accrue to a payment from State A to State B. These advantages 
and disadvantages disappear under the internal consistency 
test’s harmony assumption, which enables a court to attribute the 
interstate differences to disparity, not discrimination. 
23
it could result in “some overlap” with Illinois’ three-
factor formula). The internal consistency test eliminates 
disparities in states’ tax bases by hypothetically assuming 
that all states use the challenged state’s tax rules. As a 
result, any double taxation that remains after application 
of the harmony assumption by defi nition cannot arise from 
tax base disparities, and therefore it must originate in the 
challenged state’s tax law. 
Fifth, Petitioner concedes that “[a] state tax based 
on residency might be subject to internal consistency 
analysis if the state applied the tax so that it had an 
impact on taxpayers who actually lived in other states.” 
Pet. Br. 39, n.15. While Petitioner sees no such impact 
stemming from the challenged Maryland tax regime, the 
internal consistency test allows us to quickly understand 
the impact of a state’s tax regime upon both residents and 
nonresidents. The two shaded regions of Figure 2 show 
both the impact of the Maryland regime on Maryland 
residents with out-of-state income (like the Wynnes), 
the impact of the Maryland regime on nonresidents 
with Maryland income. The internal consistency test 
reveals what Petitioner misses: the Maryland tax regime 
disadvantages both outbound and inbound economic 
activities relative to the purely domestic activities of 
Maryland residents.
For these reasons, the internal consistency test 
represents a useful heuristic to isolate the impact of 
Maryland’s tax law on interstate commerce.21 That 
21.  See Walter Hellerstein, Is “Internal Consistency” 
Foolish?: Refl ections on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint 
on State Taxation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 138, 178 (1988) (arguing 
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Maryland’s tax regime fails the internal consistency test 
shows that Maryland overreaches. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 
514 U.S. at 169 (“A failure of internal consistency shows as 
a matter of law that a State is attempting to take more than 
its fair share of taxes from the interstate transaction”). 
Economic analysis confi rms that Maryland’s tax regime 
distorts competition between residents and nonresidents 
for investments within and without Maryland. 
E. Tax Regimes That Discriminate Against 
Interstate Commerce May Contain Elements 
That Appear To Be Facially Neutral When 
Viewed In Isolation
The internal consistency test shows that whereas 
Maryland taxes residents’ domestic income once, it taxes 
interstate income both coming and going. A state taxes 
natural persons on three kinds of income: domestic, 
outbound, and inbound. To get an accurate view of how 
a state taxes interstate commerce requires comparing 
how the state taxes domestic income to how it taxes both 
inbound and outbound income. In contrast, Petitioner’s 
disaggregated view of the Maryland tax regime, under 
which courts compare a state’s domestic tax to only one 
of its inbound tax or its outbound tax, allows Maryland to 
impede interstate commerce with impunity.
Petitioner argues that the Maryland tax does not 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause because it is 
that internal consistency can be seen as a “proxy for the fair 
apportionment criterion”). Id. at 178-88 (arguing that cases struck 
down for failure of internal consistence instead could have been 
struck down on fair apportionment grounds). Source and residence 
rules are the individual-income-tax analog to apportionment 
formulas in unitary business taxes. 
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facially neutral; Maryland taxes residents’ in-state and 
out-of-state income at the same “county” rate, namely 
3.2%. Pet. Br. 35-36. But that neutrality holds only when 
we isolate Maryland’s tax on outbound transactions and 
compare it to Maryland’s tax on domestic transactions. 
As the internal consistency test vividly demonstrates, this 
so-called neutrality depends on ignoring Maryland’s tax 
on inbound transactions.
Examining state taxes on just two out of the three 
kinds of income produces misleading results. For example, 
in a recent case, Comptroller v. Frey, 29 A.3d. 475 (Md. 
2011), cert. denied 132 S.Ct. 1796 (2012), the Maryland 
Court of Appeals considered whether Maryland’s 
inbound tax (the SNRT) discriminated against interstate 
commerce. Although the Maryland Court of Appeals 
concluded that the inbound tax was facially discriminatory 
because it applied only to nonresidents, the Maryland 
court nevertheless held that the inbound tax did not violate 
the dormant Commerce Clause because it was no higher 
than Maryland’s domestic tax.22 
Thus, in Frey, at the urging of the Maryland 
Comptroller, the Maryland Court of Appeals considered 
whether Maryland discriminated against only inbound 
commerce.  Now, just fi ve years later in Wynne, Petitioner 
asks the Supreme Court to evaluate the question of 
22.  Frey involved a Delaware resident who was a partner 
in a limited liability partnership that earned some of its income 
in Maryland. The Maryland-source income was subject to both 
the “state” and “county” portions of Maryland’s income tax on 
nonresidents. The Court of Appeals concluded that the “county” 
tax on nonresidents, the SNRT, “is a facially discriminatory tax.” 
Frey, 29 A.3d. at 497.
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whether Maryland discriminates against only outbound 
commerce. 
Combining Frey with Wynne shows the problem. In 
Frey, Petitioner succeeded in urging the Maryland Court 
of Appeals to compare Maryland’s 1.25% tax on inbound 
income with its 3.2% tax on domestic income. Frey, 29 
A.3d at 496, 505. And now, in Wynne, Petitioner asks 
the Supreme Court to compare Maryland’s 3.2% tax on 
outbound income with the same 3.2% tax on domestic 
income. By double-counting the domestic tax, Petitioner 
was able to construct: (1) in Frey a facially preferential-
to-outsiders comparison of domestic and inbound taxes 
(3.2% versus 1.25%) and (2) in Wynne a facially neutral 
comparison of domestic and outbound taxes ( 3.2% versus 
3.2%).23 
Double-counting the domestic tax obscures that 
whereas Maryland taxes residents’ domestic income once, 
it taxes interstate commerce coming and going.24 The 
combined Maryland taxes on interstate commerce (i.e., 
the inbound tax plus the outbound tax) sum to 4.45%, 
23.  Our analysis uses the highest “county” tax rate of 3.2%, 
but the actual “county” rate depends on the taxpayer’s county of 
residence and ranges from 1.25% to 3.2%. The “county” tax rate 
on nonresidents (SNRT) is set equal to the lowest “county” rate, 
which is 1.25%. The analysis here holds, no matter which “county” 
rate we consider.
24.  To avoid discouraging interstate commerce, Maryland 
could, for example, impose both taxes—the residence tax and 
the source tax—on residents’ Maryland income. In that case, 
Maryland would have uniform taxes—a uniform source tax of 
1.25% and a uniform residence tax of 3.2%. But there are other 
alternatives for Maryland to cure its violation, as we discuss below.
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thus exceeding the Maryland tax on residents’ domestic 
income of 3.2%. If all states adopted similar regimes, 
interstate commerce would always face more tax than 
domestic commerce.
Understanding the economic impact of a state’s tax 
on interstate commerce requires analysis of how the state 
taxes both inbound and outbound commerce. Courts must 
compare a state’s treatment of inbound and outbound 
commerce to the state’s treatment of purely domestic 
commerce. Isolating and comparing the tax on only two 
out of three types of income provides a partial analysis 
that may obscure discrimination, whereas analyzing all 
relevant parts of a state’s tax regime comports with the 
underlying economics as well as the Court’s dormant 
Commerce Clause precedent. The Court regularly looks 
to disparate parts of a state’s tax code to evaluate so-
called compensatory tax schemes, under which a “facially 
discriminatory tax survives strict scrutiny if it is the 
‘rough equivalent of an identifi able and ‘substantially 
similar’ tax on intrastate commerce.’” Frey, 29 A.3d at 
494 (quoting Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 511 
U.S. 93, 103 (1994)). This case involves a facially neutral 
tax that has a discriminatory impact when seen in light of 
a substantially similar tax on inbound commerce. 
Failure to adopt a comprehensive view of a state’s 
tax regime—by considering how the state taxes all of 
domestic, inbound, and outbound commerce—raises 
the risk that states will eviscerate the protection that 
the dormant Commerce Clause provides for interstate 
commerce by embedding discriminatory tax provisions 
in disparate parts of their tax regimes. Whether used as 
heuristics antecedent to economic analysis or as standards 
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in and of themselves, the rules of thumb described 
above, including the internal consistency test, prevent 
disaggregation of the state tax regime into inbound-only 
and outbound-only elements. As a result, they prevent 
the kind of incomplete analysis urged by Petitioner both 
in the instant case and in Frey. 
II. Maryland Can Cure Its Commerce Clause Violation 
In Several Ways, None Of Which Depends On The 
Taxes Collected By Any Other State
The economic analysis above leads to the conclusion 
that the Maryland tax regime violates the dormant 
Commerce Clause because it discourages interstate 
commerce compared to in-state commerce. Although the 
Supreme Court should fi nd the Maryland “county” tax 
unconstitutional, there are several ways for Maryland to 
cure the infi rmity, and Maryland, not the courts, should 
choose the cure.
Although economic analysis shows that Maryland’s tax 
regime discourages Maryland residents from engaging 
in commerce outside Maryland while simultaneously 
discouraging nonresidents from engaging in commerce 
inside Maryland, economic analysis does not and cannot 
tell us whether Maryland discriminates on either an 
outbound basis or an inbound basis. Economic analysis 
(and the internal consistency test) tell us that a state tax 
regime that does not meet the equivalence in Equation 2 
distorts competition between residents and nonresidents. 
However, economic analysis does not specify which term 
in that equation, that is, which tax rate, should change to 
make the two sides of the equation balance. For example, 
we cannot conclusively attribute the distortion caused by 
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Maryland’s tax regime exclusively to its outbound taxation 
in the form of its failure to credit other states’ taxes; nor 
can we conclusively trace the distortion exclusively to 
Maryland’s inbound taxation in the form of the SNRT. 
If the Supreme Court affi rms the decision of the 
Maryland Court of Appeals, then Maryland has several 
options. It can: 
(1) raise its domestic tax, Td,
(2) lower its outbound tax, To, including by crediting 
other states’ taxes against its “county” tax or by exempting 
residents’ income earned in other states, 
(3) lower its tax on inbound activities, Ti, or 
(4) any combination of (1) through (3) that satisfi es 
the tax rate rule given in Equation 2 or equivalently is 
internally consistent. 
Although crediting other states’ taxes generally will 
cure a state’s internal inconsistence,25 because Maryland 
25.   J. Hellerstein et al., State Taxation, supra, ¶ 4.16[1]
[b] (approving the lower court’s decision in Wynne). A common 
approach would be for Maryland to credit other states’ taxes up 
to the amount of its own tax on outbound investments. Cf. Warren, 
supra, at 153 (describing the commitment in tax treaties to either a 
foreign tax credit or exemption as aiming to “reduce impediments 
to international commerce”). However, Maryland could provide a 
smaller credit and still satisfy internal consistency. For example, 
Maryland could increase its foreign tax credit by the amount of 
the SNRT of 1.25%. By increasing the tax credit from 4.75% to 
6%, Maryland effectively makes the creditable portion of its tax 
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can cure its Commerce Clause violation in a number of 
ways, and the Constitution provides no guidance for which 
way is best, discretion lies with Maryland.26 The Supreme 
Court need not, and should not, choose a particular option 
for Maryland. Rather, it is up to Maryland to decide how 
to cure its violation. 
Indeed, upon a motion for reconsideration, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals clarifi ed that, 
A state may avoid discrimination against 
interstate commerce by providing a tax credit, 
or some other method of apportionment, to avoid 
discriminating against interstate commerce in 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
The Comptroller interprets a footnote in our 
earlier opinion to hold that a state must provide 
system a 6% worldwide tax with a full credit coupled with a 6% tax 
on Maryland-source income of nonresidents. That leaves the rest 
of the Maryland tax as a uniform, 1.95% residence tax without a 
credit on Maryland residents’ domestic and out-of-state income. 
For a discussion of the requirements for state taxes not to distort 
interstate commerce when the taxing state is offering a credit 
for taxes paid to other states (which differ from those when the 
state is not offering a credit), see Mason & Knoll, What is Tax 
Discrimination?, supra, at 1063-64, 1072-74.
26.  That is, the Constitution gives no answer to the question 
whether (for Howard County’s 3.2% tax rate) Maryland should, 
for example: (1) increase Domestic Quadrant tax to 3.2 + 1.25 – 
(3.2% x 1.25%) = 4.41%, (2) reduce the Outbound Quadrant tax 
either by eliminating that tax or by allowing a full credit against 
other states’ taxes to reduce Maryland’s 3.2% tax on outbound 
activities, or (3) eliminate the 1.25% Inbound Quadrant tax. The 
choice of how to equalize Equation 2 remains the sovereign choice 
of Maryland.
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a tax credit. Slip Op. at pp. 28-29 n.26. While 
the footnote might have been worded more 
elegantly, it referred primarily to the method 
used by the Legislature in the Maryland income 
tax; we did not mean to preclude other methods 
that might be utilized in other contexts. 
Pet. Br. App. 51-52. 
Moreover, affi rming the lower court’s decision does not 
spontaneously generate a need to resolve which state— 
Maryland or the state where the Wynnes earned their 
income—has priority to tax that income. Affi rmation 
that Maryland’s individual income tax regime violates 
the dormant Commerce Clause does not compel full 
creditability as the sole remedy, and therefore, contrary 
to Petitioner’s suggestion, it does not amount to a 
requirement that “the Maryland tax must give way in 
favor of taxes paid to other states.” Pet. Br. 31.  
Nor would affi rming the lower court bar Maryland 
from taxing its own residents’ out-of-state income. 
Petitioner argues that a requirement for Maryland to 
credit other state’s taxes would mean that Maryland “is 
effectively barred from taxing its residents’ out-of-state 
income to the extent that another state has already taxed 
that income.” Pet. Br. 13. This would, in Petitioner’s 
terms, create an “all-take-and no-give arrangement” 
between Maryland and its residents with out-of-state 
income because those residents would receive government 
services from Maryland without having to pay tax. Pet. 
Br. 24. But, consistently with the dormant Commerce 
Clause, Maryland can tax nonresidents’ out-of-state 
income at whatever rate it chooses. What Maryland 
cannot do, however, is set that rate independently of its 
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rates on domestic and inbound commerce. Maryland’s 
tax on interstate commerce can be no higher than its 
tax on domestic commerce. As a result, raising its tax on 
outbound commerce may, under certain circumstances, 
necessitate raising its tax rate on domestic commerce. 
That may be politically painful, but the alternative 
currently in force in Maryland is unconstitutional. 
As our analysis makes clear, and contrary to 
Petitioner’s suggestions, none of the options available to 
Maryland to cure its dormant Commerce Clause violation 
depends in any way on the actions taken by any other 
state. Pet. Br. 34, 41.
III. Conclusion
The crucial question under the dormant Commerce 
Clause is whether a state tax policy “establishes an 
economic barrier against competition” or an “unreasonable 
clog upon the mobility of commerce.” Moorman Mfg. 
Co., 437 U.S. at 287-88 (Powell, J., dissenting). As the 
discussion above makes clear:
The Maryland “coun ty” tax discourages interstate 
commerce in favor of in-state commerce. The tax regime 
adversely affects both residents with out-of-state income 
and nonresidents with in-state income. Thus, the Maryland 
“county” tax violates the dormant Commerce Clause and 
so the Court should hold.
Economic analysis and the internal consistency test 
yield the same results for whether a state tax distorts 
commerce because both methods test for the same rate 
equivalence. The internal consistency test therefore 
represents a simple way for the Court to determine 
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whether or not a state’s tax favors in-state commerce 
over interstate commerce. The test also reduces the risk 
that parts of a state tax regime, considered in isolation, 
will appear to pass constitutional muster even though 
combining the challenged rule with other parts of the 
state’s tax regime reveals systematic discouragement of 
interstate commerce.
Maryland can cure the constitutional infi rmity in its 
“county” tax in multiple ways. Accordingly, the Court 
should affi rm the decision below and send the case back to 
Maryland so that the Maryland legislature can decide how 
to render the tax consistent with the Commerce Clause. 
The Court need not, and should not, require Maryland to 
provide a tax credit for taxes paid to other jurisdictions 
up to the amount of the “county” tax.
   Respectfully submitted, 
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